Russia and the United States has appeared strained at times, with both countries engaging in rhetoric over the Russian military response to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia and the continued United States plan to deploy Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) in Eastern Europe. It would seem these two countries have large differences, but closer examination is required to determine the nature of the relationship and develop potential areas of common interest. This project examines the United StatesRussia relationship in light of Russian foreign policy and national security objectives and outlines specific policy recommendations for the United States regarding Russia. These recommendations are based on examining Russian -U.S. interests in four critical strategic structural areas: sovereignty and spheres of influence, oil production / exports, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism.
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: FORGING A WAY AHEAD
President Barack Obama enters office with many foreign policy challenges. The primary issue facing the new President continues to be the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, United States relations with Russia pose an extremely important challenge for the Obama Administration. Russia will play a significant role in the future world order, and the United States must carefully approach this complicated country.
Understanding Russian intentions is critical to developing long-term relations that benefit both countries.
Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu said, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril". This project begins with a review of recent Russian history. It discusses Russian foreign policy since 1991, during the post-Soviet era. Russia has a millennial history and culture, but close scrutiny of the last 18 years is essential for an understanding of current Russian thought. Once this history is traced and Russian policy goals and objectives identified, the project will examine four specific strategic structural areas that affect relations between the United States and Russia. These areas are: sovereignty and spheres of influence, oil production / exports, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. Within these four structural areas challenges arise for both the United
States and Russia. However, there are also opportunities. This project will explore these challenges and opportunities in order to develop policy recommendations that can lead to a reduction of tensions in the challenge areas as well as capitalizing on the areas of opportunity to further enhance the relationship of these two very important strategic nations.
While specific recommendations follow at the end of this project, the overarching "Russia has arrived at a historic fork in the road, as fateful and filled with potential as any in history. Already the change (under Putin) is far-reaching. Russia has made of itself something different from any Russia before, and it has introduced into its foreign policy features never before present". 20 Putin still faces severe internal struggles, most notably a declining population and struggling economy. According to Nicholas
Eberstadt, "Russia is in the midst of a genuine demographic disaster from which its rulers have no obvious exit strategy". 21 The Russian population has declined by almost 
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Russia appears to have selected economic politics as its foreign policy position even as it continues to battle internal economic and demographic problems. Russia will leverage its immense oil production capability to get what it wants from Europe and the Baltic states, will continue to develop its economy and look for opportunities within the global economic system, and fashion relations with major world powers, particularly the United States, on an issue by issue basis. 24 The United States must understand this last point. It will not only aid in understanding Russian intentions, but will assist in developing a coherent strategy for relations with Putin's Russia.
In the last year it appears that tensions between the United States and Russia 34 For the Russian economy, this has proven to be a benefit and a curse. Simply put, as the price of oil and gas goes, so goes the Russian economy.
The benefit of rising oil prices in the early 2000s allowed Russia to amass incredible financial reserves. Windfall oil profits brought Russia's cash reserves to just under $600 billion in August 2008. However, the declining economy since then has had a significant impact on Russian cash reserves, as the value fell to $484 billion by October, with an amazing $31 billion drop in just one week. 35 Since oil profits are the major part of the Russian economy, a sudden decline in prices means a continued dip into the cash reserves account, with declining overall economic prosperity.
Previously Russia has used oil as a bargaining chip with Ukraine. In 2006, and again in 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine, accusing Ukraine of siphoning off natural gas bound for Europe. 36 Gazprom, Russia's oil monopoly that provides much of Europe's oil and natural gas requirements cut off supplies to pressure Ukraine to pay higher prices. 37 While the gas stoppage only lasted a few days, the fact that Russia is using natural gas as a tool to raise overall prices shows just how important their reliance on oil and gas is.
Nuclear non-proliferation is vital to both Russian and United States national security interests. It has also been a contentious area due to the United States plans to employ an ABM system in Eastern Europe.
In 1986 Russia and the United States had almost 64,000 nuclear warheads.
Today, although those overall numbers are greatly reduced due to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), these two nations still maintain over 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and weapon-grade material. 38 While it is unlikely that nations will engage in nuclear war, there is a fear that, with the rising threat of trans-national terrorism, an extremist terrorist group could use a nuclear weapon to rain terror on the world. Neither the United States nor Russia wants to become the nuclear "Home Depot"
for terrorist organizations. 39 Indications are that, although the chance of acquiring nuclear weapons is small, rogue terrorist organization will try. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) data base has logged 408 cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material (ITNM). Fourteen of these cases were labeled most dangerous, pertaining to highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Diplomacy without strength is sterile. Strength without diplomacy tempts posturing. We believe that the fundamental interests of the United States, Europe, and Russia are more aligned today-or can be made so-even in the wake of the Georgian crisis, than at any point in recent history. We must not waste that opportunity. 50 With this in mind, the United States should adopt a policy of "cautious engagement", or, as outlined by Janusz Bugajski, "practical engagement". Mr. Bugajski defines this concept as "combining practical engagement with the Kremlin on issues of mutual concern, such as anti-proliferation and counterterrorism, with a strategic assertiveness that strengthens the Atlantic community". 
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Negotiating a new START arrangement goes beyond non-proliferation. As one analyst noted, above and beyond reducing the number of Russian nuclear weapons that could be targeted in our direction, if you look over the past twenty years, when there's a nuclear arms dialogue between Washington and Moscow, it seems to have a broader positive impact on the relationship. The Russians like it, if for no other reason that it's an acknowledgement that they are a superpower on nuclear terms, on par with the United States. kilometer range, enough to reach Israel, Europe, and Russia. 59 As Dr. Blank says, "If Russia is so concerned about these missiles, it would be better advised to use its influence in Iran to stop that country from building nuclear weapons". 60 Our diplomatic efforts with Russia should focus on getting them to attack the problem, a nuclear Iran, rather than the solution, the ABM system in Europe. The objectives of U.S. trade policy include achieving more equitable and reciprocal market access for U.S. goods, services, and investment, and reducing and eliminating barriers to trade and other market-distorting policies and practices. American consumers and Russian businesses will benefit from lower trade barriers to Russian goods, such as steel, fuel for nuclear reactors, and certain types of aircraft. The negotiations over Russia's membership in the WTO should clearly focus on such mutual interests. 64 Dr. Ariel Cohen wrote this in 2002 and it remains relevant today. In today's global world, Russia benefits from integration with world markets. Russian involvement in trade, capital projects, and world finance has helped them develop economic stability.
Accession into the WTO "can be used as a means towards locking in domestic reforms, ensuring that Russia benefits from a rules-based international trading regime, as well as strengthen Russia's future integration into the world economy by improving its policies and institutional capacity". 65 Russia needs the approval of all WTO members to complete the accession process, including Georgia. 66 
